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At the Conjunction of Love and Money: Comment on 
Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? 
Evidence (or Not) from Economics and Law 
William W. Bratton  
Professor Nelson has it absolutely right. Maximization is a 
thought construct that operates at an ideological level and is not 
descriptively robust. It is not a natural imperative, even as the need to 
profit certainly operates as a constraint, applying tightly or loosely 
depending on the particular firm and market. Nor should we think of 
the capitalist firm in terms of love ―or‖ money. We should instead 
describe it around the ―and‖ in ―love and money.‖  
This Comment will address a question that arises in the wake of 
Professor Nelson’s intervention: Why did maximization come to 
dominate our thinking about firms? The answer is that academic 
paradigms and thinking about firms both tend to follow from the 
outside political economy. Indeed, capitalism itself has to take the 
outside political economy as it finds it and work with the social 
settlement it is handed. It just happens that for the last thirty years or 
so we have had a political economy that is particularly receptive to 
the maximization mindset.  
It was not always this way. The present paradigm displaced a 
predecessor borne of the Great Depression, a period in our history 
that pushed us into the arms of a protective, regulatory state. The 
accompanying mindset, which endured for decades, took us to the 
other side of the love and money divide. Now, if it does not sound 
quite right to describe the New Deal regulatory state as ―loving,‖ 
perhaps a modification of the operative statement of opposing 
ideological positions can be accepted—instead of love and money, 
we can oppose cooperation and competition, and stability and 
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maximization. Whatever the characterization, a look back at the New 
Deal regulatory state and the theories that justified it helps us to 
understand the contingent character of the theories prevailing today, 
and to appreciate the tie between descriptive accuracy and the use of 
―and‖ rather than ―or‖ as the conjunction. Drawing on some previous 
work,
1
 I will present the New Deal mindset through the lens of the 
writings of Adolf Berle, one of its architects.  
Berle’s writing continues to be invoked as deep background for 
today’s shareholder primacy paradigm. But Michael Wachter and I 
have shown that the invocation rests on a faulty understanding of 
Berle.
2
 When Berle elevated the shareholder interest over the 
management interest in a famous law review article published in 
1932, his concern lay entirely with unchecked management power.
3
 
In the absence of some other, more effective check, he commended a 
trust for the shareholders’ benefit as a palliative. But as his 
contemporaneous writings make clear, his preferred mode of 
management power containment was government control.
4
 He got 
that one year later during the New Deal’s first hundred days. He 
would never again put forward the shareholder interest as a 
countervailing power within corporate law. And at no time did he 
advance shareholder value maximization as an appropriate corporate 
purpose. 
Indeed, when Berle returned to these topics a quarter century later, 
he changed his diagnosis and pronounced management power 
benign.
5
 He had two reasons: first, the big stick, post-New Deal state 
was managing the economy from ―an unchallenged position of higher 
authority,‖ and second, there was a ―solid political consensus in 
 
 1. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 737 (2001); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s 
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008) 
[hereinafter Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010). 
 2. See Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins, supra note 1, at 109–13. 
 3. See Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365, 1366–67 (1932). 
 4. See Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins, supra note 1, at 128–30. 
 5. Id. at 133–34. 
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support.‖
6
 Berle depicted a regulatory state that could and did 
accurately articulate the social welfare function, and then guide and 
push the markets to the right result, unencumbered by the ideology of 
maximization. He described a benign equipoise amongst strong 
organizations, an equipoise constrained by a wider public consensus 
that empowered the central government and its social welfare agenda. 
The Depression was still a vivid memory, so the public wanted 
stability, in particular job security; if it took regulation to get us from 
here to there, fine.
7
  
Managers had to play ball. Whether they liked it or not, they were 
caught between the regulatory state and the public consensus. Failure 
to satisfy the public meant new regulation; avoidance of new 
regulation meant satisfying the public. So, as a practical matter, 
managers had to be public-regarding. Indeed, Berle described them as 
quasi-civil servants.
8
 Meanwhile, the shareholders just did not matter. 
They were passive collectors of dividends with no productive role to 
play in the political economy. In fact, capital market constraints had 
ceased to matter more generally. Corporations got new equity capital 
by retaining earnings and only rarely went to Wall Street to sell 
stock. The markets served only to provide liquidity to the rich; there 
was no disciplinary value added.
9
  
Berle’s writing thus lets us trace our evolution from the market 
driven political economy of the early twentieth century to a quasi-
corporatist state that privileged stability over maximization and 
sought an alignment of profit and public responsiveness. 
Significantly, the corporate law of Berle’s time easily accommodated 
a quasi-civil service role for managers. It could do so again today 
without any need for adjustment. Corporate law does not require 
profit maximization now any more than it did then.  
In fact, corporate law could not successfully require maximization 
even if a corporate lawmaker ready to wield a maximization mandate 
suddenly appeared. Maximization can only be modeled. In the real 
world of going concerns no one really knows if wealth is being 
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maximized.
10
 It follows that corporate law can only facilitate, 
clearing the field so that firms can attempt to maximize the value they 
produce (assuming an intensely competitive environment) or 
otherwise prosper in the absence of intense competition. Adherence 
to this facilitative mission keeps corporate law relatively unburdened 
by any ideology, at least apart from its basic commitment to 
capitalism. It offers a framework capacious enough to accommodate 
different political economies and social settlements. The framework, 
with its business judgment envelope, holds out room for cooperation 
with the state and redistribution on the one hand and room for 
leveraged buyouts and plant closings on the other.  
Meanwhile, corporate legal theories shift along with political 
economies, coloring in the capacious legal framework in accordance 
with the theorists’ presuppositions.  
To get a sense of today’s colors, let us hypothesize how a 
maximizer would respond to the foregoing description of the 
corporate law framework. The description, one would hear, misses 
the point. To ask whether corporate law can be structured 
affirmatively to effect maximization puts the wrong question. Indeed, 
a maximizer happily would agree that corporations, left to their own 
institutional devices, will never push toward maximization. Such are 
the effects of agency costs. And that is where markets come in. 
Maximizers look at corporate law’s capacious framework and see it 
constituting hierarchies that get in the way of the markets that should 
be left free to do the maximizing. And even if real world markets do 
not maximize perfectly, as they do in theoretical models, at least they 
do what they do spontaneously, free of the heavy hand of hierarchical 
direction. 
For today’s corporate law maximizers, the crucial moment in the 
history of post-war economic theory is Jensen and Meckling’s 
introduction of agency theory in 1976.
11
 Neoclassical economists like 
Alfred Marshall assumed that firms maximized, but offered no 
 
 10. See William W. Bratton, An Anatomy of Corporate Legal Theory, 24 RES. L. & ECON. 
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microeconomic theory of the firm.
12
 Hierarchical organization was 
thought to be intrinsically unsuited to such an exercise.
13
 Jensen and 
Meckling’s agency theory
14
 opened the door to a microeconomic, 
market-driven picture of the corporation’s internal workings—a 
whole new world for maximizing. And crucially, it did so at a time 
when beliefs were shifting away from the Berlian political economy 
where regulation moderated competitive forces to one where 
competitive forces played an increasingly unregulated role. Stability 
lost out as the goal, replaced by competitive fitness in an 
uncontrollable international framework. 
Corporate legal theory, as always taking its instructions from the 
outside political economy, promptly reconstituted itself to look to 
deregulation and market controls. And so, from the 1980s on, 
corporate law has obsessed on the same structural question: Who 
should decide how the firm should be managed, the managers or the 
shareholders themselves? The question poses a choice between 
institutional security and a model driven by informational signals 
from the financial markets. The shareholder side contends that 
prevailing legal and institutional structures fail to provide a platform 
conducive to aggressive entrepreneurship, instead inviting 
management self-dealing and conservative decision making biased 
toward institutional stability.
15
 It looks to actors in financial markets 
for corrective inputs. Unlike the managers, who are conflicted and 
risk averse, the shareholders, who look to the market price and 
nothing else, come to the table with a pure financial incentive to 
maximize value.
16
 So the maximizers will readily agree that many 
firms survive indefinitely when making decisions that are not in their 
shareholders’ best interests. They just want to put a stop to it.  
I do not think the market control agenda makes sense as a policy 
proposition.
17
 But for present purposes, the point is that maximization 
 
 12. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives 
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1495–96 (1989). 
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 17. Id. at 688–716. 
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is a direction to which some people point, rather than a goal that 
firms must meet. They suggest that institutions can be structured so 
as to move us in that direction with markets as the means to the end. 
If you want market control, then a stripped-down model of the 
subject works well.  
Indeed, it works all too well, a point aptly stated by Professor 
Nelson: 
What this Article does seek to discredit is the belief that there 
is something intrinsic in the economic or legal structure of 
commerce that forces firms, inexorably, as if run on rails, to 
neglect values of care and concern in order to strive for every 
last dollar of profits. This widespread belief detracts from 
human or ecological welfare, for two reasons. First, it lets 
shareholders, directors, and managers of corporations morally 
―off the hook‖ for the social and environmental consequences 
of business decisions. Second, it places the entire burden of 
maintaining the moral order onto non-business entities, such as 
government, nonprofits, and families.
18
 
 To see widespread adherence to the automaton model of the firm 
that Professor Nelson describes, along with an array of pernicious 
effects, just take a look at our present financial crisis. There is a 
prominent line of analysis that absolves the banks that caused the 
crisis (and the human actors in charge of them) from responsibility 
for their own externalities, depicting them as capitalists competing as 
usual.
19
 From there, in a strange twist, blame befalls those who 
regulated, failed to regulate, or deregulated the companies that did the 
deeds.
20
 All responsibilities for shortcomings in the moral order are 
ascribed to the government, while the companies themselves dodge 
the bullet. For further examples, all the reader has to do is open a 
newspaper. 
 
 18. Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) from 
Economics and Law, 35 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 69, 71–72 (2011). 
 19. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 77–79 (2010) 
(providing an explanation for why banks took the risks leading to the financial crisis in light of 
the externalities that led to the market collapse). 
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I used to dismiss the amoral automaton firm as something that 
appealed only to ideologues at the fringe, and then only normatively. 
The financial crisis has shown this assumption to be naive. When the 
crisis first hit, I was sure that it amounted to enough of a shock to 
alter the habits of mind Professor Nelson describes. But I was wrong 
about that too.  
 
